3 what costs make up a variety of transaction costs. Examples of transaction costs: theory, forms and types

Keywords

transaction costs/ company / commercial organization/ opportunism / transaction costs / firm / commercial organization / opportunism

annotation scientific article on economics and business, author of scientific work - Medushushskaya Inna Evgenievna

Relevance and objectives of the study. The process of interaction of economic agents in modern world becomes more complex, the number of transactions multiplies, the flow of information increases, and as a result transaction costs modern commercial firms are increasing dramatically. Despite the fact that studies in the leading areas of institutionalism are widely represented in the Russian press, however, there are not many studies that present methods for assessing transaction costs and specific examples of their calculations. The purpose of the work is to identify and analyze transaction costs commercial organization in Russia to develop recommendations for their optimization. Materials and methods. The goal of the study was achieved through system analysis transaction costs, their classification. General economic methods were used - dialectical, abstraction, analysis, induction, modeling, as well as statistical methods, comparison method, etc. Results. Transaction costs are the costs of the interaction of economic agents, their level determines the effectiveness of such interaction. The main reasons for their occurrence: paid information; incompleteness and asymmetry of information; opportunistic behavior; limited rationality. classified in detail transaction costs commercial firm according to various criteria, their role in present stage. The calculation of transaction costs is given on the example model contract pharmaceutical organization with dealer network. The ways of minimization of transaction costs of a modern firm have been developed. Findings. The Russian economy is an example of high transaction costs. It is under such conditions that modern commercial organizations . The amount of transaction costs of a modern firm increases due to the inefficiency of economic institutions, i.e. norms and rules by which the interaction of economic agents is carried out. The study made it possible not only to determine, classify transaction costs modern firm according to various criteria and evaluate them on a specific example, but also formulate a set of measures to minimize them.

TRANSACTION COSTS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION

background. The process of interaction of economic agents in the modern world is becoming more complicated, a number of transactions are multiplying, the information flow is growing, and, as a result, transaction costs of modern commercialfirms are sharply increasing. Despite the fact that researches in the leading areas of institutionalism are widely represented in the Russian press, not many studies present the methodology for assessing transaction costs and specific examples of calculations. The purpose of the article is to identify and analyze transaction costs of commercial organizations in Russia to develop recommendations on their optimization. materials and methods. The objectives were implemented through a systematic analysis of transaction costs , their classification. The author used general economic methods – dialectical, abstraction, analysis, induction, modeling, and statistical methods, the method of comparison, and others. results. Transaction costs are the costs of interaction of economic agents, their level determines the effectiveness of such cooperation. The main reasons for their occurrence: payment for information; incompleteness and asymmetry of information; opportunistic behaviour; bounded rationality. The article classifies transaction costsof commercial firms in detail by various criteria, defines their role at the present stage, and gives calculations of transaction costs by the example of a model contract of a pharmaceutical organization with a dealer network. The author has developed ways to minimize transaction costs of a modern company. Conclusions. The Russian economy is an example of high transaction costs. It is these conditions where modern commercial organizations operate. The value of transaction costs of a company is increasing as a result of inefficiency of modern economic institutions, rules and regulations controlling the interaction of economic agents. The study allows not only to identify and classify transaction costs of a modern company by various criteria, but also to formulate a set of measures to minimize them.

To complete a transaction, an agent may be required to perform many different operations. Each of them can cost him a lot of money and be accompanied by mistakes and losses. Hence the variety of types of transaction costs. Consider some types of transaction costs.

1. Information search costs.

Before a transaction is made, you need to have information about where you can find potential buyers or sellers of consumer goods or production factors and what are the prevailing this moment prices. Costs of this kind are made up of the time and resources required to conduct a search, as well as losses associated with the incompleteness and imperfection of the information received.

The search can be conducted on both sides of the market - both sellers and buyers. For example, in the labor market, employers advertise available vacancies, send applications to employment services, test and select candidates, and so on. In turn, job seekers interview friends and relatives, register with employment agencies, send resumes, call or visit companies that interest them. In commodity markets, manufacturers spend a lot of money on studying consumer demand, marketing, advertising, and consumers - on studying brochures, visiting stores, standing in lines.

We can also distinguish two types of information search costs. For example, the goal of an agent may be to become familiar with as many options as possible, or to learn as much as possible about one option.

2. The costs of negotiating.

The market requires the diversion of significant funds for negotiations on the terms of the exchange, for the conclusion and execution of contracts. The more participants in the transaction and the more complex its subject, the higher these costs. Losses due to badly negotiated, poorly designed and unsecured agreements are a powerful source of these costs.

3. Measurement costs.

Any product or service is a set of characteristics. When exchanging, only some of them are inevitably taken into account, and the accuracy of their assessment

is extremely approximate. Sometimes the qualities of a product of interest are not measurable at all, and one has to use intuition to evaluate them (for example, to judge the taste of apples by their color).

Evaluation of the quality of goods can be carried out on the side of both sellers and buyers. In order to avoid irrational duplication, it is desirable that the measurement be made once and that it be taken over by someone who is able to do it at a lower cost. The purpose of their economy due to such forms of business practices as warranty repair, company labels, purchase of batches of goods according to samples, etc.

4. Costs of specification and protection of property rights.

This category includes expenses for the maintenance of courts, arbitration, government agencies, the time and resources required to restore violated rights, as well as losses from their poor specification and unreliable protection. Any violation must first be recorded, then assess its severity, ensure the capture or appearance of the offender, and impose a punishment. All this is far from free.

5. Costs of opportunistic behavior.

The term "opportunistic behavior" was introduced by O. Williamson. This is the name of dishonest behavior that violates the terms of the transaction or aimed at obtaining unilateral benefits to the detriment of the partner. Various cases of lying, deceit, idleness at work, etc. fall under this rubric. Costs of this type are associated with the difficulty of accurately assessing the post-contract behavior of the other party to the transaction.

There are two main forms of opportunistic behavior. The first is called "moral hazard". Moral hazard arises when in a contract one party relies on the other, and obtaining valid information about its behavior requires high costs or is impossible at all. The most common type of opportunistic behavior of this kind is shirking, when the agent works with less efficiency than is required of him under the contract.

Particularly favorable soil for shirking is created in the conditions of joint work by the whole group. For example, how to single out the personal contribution of each employee to the overall result of the activities of the "team" of a factory or government agency?

We have to use surrogate measurements and, say, judge the productivity of many workers not by the result, but by the costs (like the duration of work), but these indicators often turn out to be inaccurate.

If the personal contribution of each agent to the overall result is measured with large errors, then his reward will be weakly related to the actual efficiency of his work. Hence the negative incentives that encourage shirking.

In private firms and government agencies, special, complex and expensive structures are being created, whose tasks include monitoring the behavior of agents, detecting cases of opportunism, imposing penalties, etc. Reducing the costs of opportunistic behavior main function a significant part of the administrative apparatus various organizations.

The second form of opportunistic behavior is extortion. Opportunities for it appear when several production factors work in close cooperation for a long time and get used to each other so much that each becomes irreplaceable, unique for the rest of the group. This means that if some factor decides to leave the group, then the other participants in the cooperation will not be able to find an equivalent replacement for it on the market and will suffer irreparable losses. Therefore, the owners of unique (in relation to a given group of participants) resources have the opportunity for blackmail in the form of a threat to leave the group. Even when "extortion" remains only a possibility, it always turns out to involve real losses. The most radical form of protection against extortion is the transformation of interdependent (interspecific) resources into jointly owned property, the integration of property in the form of a single bundle of powers for all team members.

6. Costs of "politicization".

This general term can be used to designate the costs that accompany decision-making within organizations. If the participants are endowed with equal rights, then decisions are made on a collective basis, by voting. If they are located at different levels of the hierarchical ladder, then the higher ones unilaterally make decisions that are mandatory for the lower ones. But with both collective and centralized decision-making, there is no minimum guarantee of efficiency. The majority of the voters of the country, the majority of the shareholders of the corporation, the majority of the members of the cooperative can speak out in favor of a decision that obviously harms the minority. The leader can make a decision that is extremely disadvantageous for the subordinates to whom it concerns, without any agreement with them. The processes of collective and centralized decision-making are closely intertwined, so that it is not easy to place them in one category. Very often, the body of centralized management itself is formed on a collective basis. Therefore, let's say, the decision of the Board of Directors can be characterized as collective in relation to its members, but as centralized in relation to managers and employees of the corporation. However, in theoretical analysis, these two aspects can be distinguished.

7. Costs of collective decision making.

These costs are typical for organizations that are jointly owned and managed by the principles of direct or representative democracy - legislatures, clubs, cooperatives, partnerships, etc. They are made up of several elements. First, as is known from economic theory, majority decision making does not provide optimal results (the famous median voter theorem). Secondly, the very process of developing joint decisions can absorb a lot of time, effort and money. These costs are the greater, the more numerous and heterogeneous the composition of the participants, that is, the greater the divergence of their interests.

The opportunities to benefit from the exchange are affected not only by the total amount of TAI, but also by the distribution of their burden among the participants in the exchange. The efficiency of resource allocation depends not only on the general level of TAI and distribution among interested parties, but also on the structure determined by the directions of potential and real agreements between economic agents.

TAI is not the only component of production costs. Thus, it is necessary to determine the relationship between transaction and transformation costs.

Definition, conditions of occurrence, meaning

The first, most general definition that could be given is based on the definition of a transaction:

Transaction costs are the value of the resources expended on a transaction.

Production costs, in accordance with the new institutional economic theory, consist of two parts - transformation costs associated with a change or reproduction of the physical characteristics of goods, and transaction costs, reflecting the change or reproduction of "legal", and more generally - institutional characteristics.

If we imagine the economy as a life support system, then TAI can be considered as the costs of operating the economic system. Defining the content of the concept of "transaction costs" sometimes use the analogy proposed by Kenneth Arrow: TAI in the economic system is similar to the phenomenon of friction in the world of physical objects. This analogy allows us to talk about the general spread of TAI.

The concept of TAI is of key importance in the new institutional theory, since institutions are explained not through the prism of a conflict of class interests, but from the point of view of the opportunities for saving on TAI.

To explain the phenomenon of TAI, two points are most significant: the discrepancy between the economic interests of interacting agents and the phenomenon of uncertainty. Uncertainty is determined not only through the fragmentation (and, as a rule, distortion) of information available to individuals, but also through the limited possibilities for its processing that they (agents) have.

Given the presence of two aspects in the explanation of TAI, they can be interpreted as the costs of coordinating the activities of economic agents and removing the distribution conflict between them. Since coordination is a key component of any organization, then without taking into account TAI (explicitly or implicitly) economic analysis would be unproductive.

If TAI were equal to zero, then, following the premises of the new institutional (and neoclassical) theory, resources would be distributed and used where they have the greatest value (if the income effect is not taken into account), regardless of the initial distribution of property rights among economic agents . In accordance with the premise of zero TAIs, the interpreters of R. Coase formulated a theorem that bears his name. An abbreviated version can be presented in following form: with zero TAI and income effect, as well as exogenous prices in relation to the actions of economic agents, the initial distribution of property rights does not affect the efficiency of their final allocation.

As a comment to this definition it must be emphasized that R. Coase himself never spoke about the model of the world with zero TAI in a positive way. R. Coase's first work, which received worldwide recognition several decades later, "The Nature of the Firm" (1937), is based precisely on the premise of non-zero TAI. The formulated theorem is significant in the sense that it indirectly shows that positive TAI are important for various options for the initial distribution of property rights in terms of the efficiency of the final allocation of resources.

Transaction and transformation costs.

TAI is an element of production costs along with transformational costs, which are the object of analysis in traditional neoclassical theory.

However, it should be noted that the definition of costs as transactional or transformational is not invariant with respect to the chosen reference point. For example, the buyer of an apartment, paying for the services of a real estate company, bears TAI. They are the income of the real estate company. At the same time, real estate agents provide transformational services for this firm, which is reflected in the appearance of transformational costs. Thus, assuming that the firm operates in a competitive environment, long term its economic profit is equal to zero, respectively, the transformation costs are equal in size to TAI. However, the problem is complicated by the fact that the real estate company itself also bears TAI by purchasing transaction services, in particular, to ensure the security of its activities. Expenses under this item turn out to be income of organizations providing security entrepreneurial activity and protection of contracts. This chain can be continued. Here we also run into the well-known problem of double counting, which requires the definition market value final transaction services.

There is not only complementarity between transaction and transformation costs, but also their substitutability.

It is also known that limited goods have a set of characteristics that can be divided into two groups: physical and legal. The first group includes properties such as size, shape, taste, color, smell, chemical composition, weight, location in space and time. The second group includes the powers that make up the property rights. Two types of characteristics of goods correspond to two functions: transformational and transactional, which allow you to create and change them.

A function is called transformational if its implementation is aimed at changing the physical properties of a thing. A function is considered transactional if the characteristics of a thing related to property rights change.

The following example is based on a comparison of two types of exchange: personalized and impersonal. In the framework of a personalized exchange, due to the high degree of repetition of transactions with the same participants, fraud, fraud, theft, violation of obligations are either completely absent or are poorly represented. Thus, direct, explicit TAI in such an exchange is low. At the same time, personalized exchange is possible within very narrow limits, which turns out to be an obstacle to the division of labor and specialization. In turn, specialization is a condition for reducing TFI. Consequently, under the conditions of personalized exchange, the total costs are high due to transformational costs. At the same time, impersonal exchange allows economic agents to produce with low transformation costs due to a radical expansion of the scale of specialization. However, as the one-move prisoner's dilemma shows, the conditions of which are quite consistent with the conditions of a depersonalized exchange, an equilibrium set of strategies will involve mutual deceit, fraud, falsification of goods, unscrupulousness, which in some cases requires the intervention of a third party.

It is the structure and dynamics of TAI (together with transformational costs and technology) that determine the forms of organization economic activity, content and nature of real transactions. This circumstance makes it possible to formulate a hypothesis, according to which not only technology, but also institutions are the source of economic growth.

The properties of existing institutions have a significant effect on the characteristics of economic performance, as evidenced by studies showing that countries with high quality institutions were in a better position than countries with higher quality macroeconomic policies and large stock human capital but low quality institutions.

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By discipline:

Institutional economy

Transaction costs and their types

Introduction

1. Transaction costs

2. The concept and types of transactions

4. Ronald Coase

5. Coase theorem

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

In the past, economic theory has suffered from its inability to articulate its presuppositions clearly. In developing a theory, economists have often shied away from examining the foundations on which it was built. But such a study is essential not only to prevent misinterpretations and unnecessary disputes that arise from insufficient knowledge of the assumptions of the theory, but also because of the extreme importance for economic theory of reasonable judgment when choosing between competing sets of theoretical premises.

Almost the central section of microeconomic theory is the theory of the firm, which enriched economics with the concept of transaction costs. The use of this particular concept for the study of economic processes at the present time seems to be very fruitful. It is the possibility of reducing transaction costs that makes the replacement of market exchange effective. internal organization which explains the existence of firms.

1. Transaction costs (costs)

The theory of transaction costs is an integral part of a new direction in modern economic science - neo-institutionalism. Its development is primarily associated with the names of two economists - R. Coase and O. Williamson.

The basic unit of analysis in the theory of transaction costs is an act of economic interaction, a deal, a transaction. The category of transaction is understood extremely broadly and is used to denote the exchange of both goods and legal obligations, transactions of both short-term and long-term nature, requiring both detailed documentation and assuming a simple mutual understanding of the parties. The costs and losses that may accompany such interaction are called transaction costs.

Transaction costs are the central explanatory category of all neo-institutional analysis. The orthodox neoclassical theory considered the market as a perfect mechanism, where there is no need to take into account the costs of servicing transactions. The key importance for the operation of the economic system of transaction costs was realized thanks to R. Coase's article "The Nature of the Firm" (1937). He showed that in every transaction it is necessary to negotiate, exercise supervision, establish relationships, resolve differences.

Initially, transaction costs were defined by R. Coase as "the costs of using the market mechanism." Later, this concept acquired a broader meaning. It began to denote any kind of costs that accompany the interaction of economic agents, regardless of where it takes place - in the market or within organizations, since business cooperation within hierarchical structures (such as firms) is also not free from friction and loss. According to K. Dalman's definition, which won the most recognition, transaction costs include the costs of collecting and processing information, negotiating and making decisions, monitoring compliance with contracts and forcing them to be fulfilled. The introduction of the idea of positive transaction costs into scientific circulation was a major theoretical achievement.

2. The concept and types of transactions

The concept of transaction was first introduced into scientific circulation by J. Commons.

A transaction is not an exchange of goods, but an alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms created by society. This definition makes sense (Commons) because institutions provide for the dissemination of will individual person outside the area within which it can influence environment directly by their actions, that is, beyond the scope of physical control, and therefore turn out to be transactions, in contrast to individual behavior as such or the exchange of goods.

Commons distinguished three main types of transactions:

1) Transaction transaction - serves to carry out the actual alienation and assignment of property rights and freedoms, and in its implementation, the mutual consent of the parties is required, based on the economic interest of each of them.

2) Transaction of management - in it the key is the relationship of management of subordination, which involves such interaction between people when the right to make decisions belongs to only one side.

3) Rationing transaction - with it, asymmetry is preserved legal status parties, but the place of the managing party is occupied by a collective body that performs the function of specifying rights. Rationing transactions include: drawing up the company's budget by the board of directors, the federal budget by the government and approval by a representative authority, decision arbitration court about the dispute that arises between the actors through which wealth is distributed. There is no control in the rationing transaction.

Through such a transaction, wealth is endowed to one or another economic agent.

The presence of transaction costs makes certain types of transactions more or less economical, depending on the circumstances of time and place. Therefore, the same operations can be mediated by different types of transactions, depending on the rules they order.

Transactions range from simple, such as buying a bunch of radishes from the market, to complex ones, such as implementing an ERP system with the help of external consultants. Complex and responsible agreements are always formalized by contracts. Any Transaction consists of two parts:

· Preparation of an agreement. In this phase, the buyer must find the seller, collect information about the prices (price), evaluate the quality, select the seller and come to an agreement. The seller must buy a place on the market, pass the quality control of his goods, continuously collect information about the prices

· Implementation of the agreement. In this phase, the buyer pays for the goods, receives it at his disposal, evaluates its quality again.

Each Transaction necessarily defines 4 groups of parameters:

The participants in the transaction

The resources used in the transaction and the expected results,

The rights of participants to resources and results,

· Duties of the parties.

3. Transaction costs and their types

Transaction costs - any losses arising from the inefficiency of joint decisions, plans, contracts and established structures. Transaction costs limit opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation.

Developing Coase's analysis, supporters of the transactional approach have proposed various classifications of transaction costs (costs). According to one of them, there are:

1. Information search costs. Before a transaction is made, one must have information about where potential buyers or sellers of consumption goods or factors of production can be found and what are the current prices. Costs of this kind are made up of the time and resources required to conduct a search, as well as losses associated with the incompleteness and imperfection of the information received.

2. The costs of negotiating. The market requires the diversion of significant funds for negotiations on the terms of the exchange, for the conclusion and execution of contracts. The more participants in the transaction and the more complex its subject, the higher these costs. Losses due to badly negotiated, poorly designed and unsecured agreements are a powerful source of these costs.

3. Measurement costs. Any product or service is a set of characteristics. Only a few of them are inevitably taken into account in the exchange, and the accuracy of their assessment is extremely approximate. Sometimes the qualities of a product of interest are generally immeasurable and one has to use intuition to evaluate them. The goal of saving them is due to such forms of business practices as warranty repairs, branded labels,

4. Costs of specification and .. This category includes the costs of maintaining courts, arbitration, state bodies, the time and resources required to restore violated rights, as well as losses from their poor specification and unreliable protection.

5. Costs of opportunistic behavior. The term "opportunistic behavior" was introduced by O. Williamson. This is the name of dishonest behavior that violates the terms of the transaction or aimed at obtaining unilateral benefits to the detriment of the partner. Under this rubric fall various cases of lies, deceit, idleness at work, neglecting the obligations assumed. There are two main forms of opportunism, the first of which is typical for relations within organizations, and the second for market transactions.

Shirking is work with less return and responsibility than it should be under the terms of the contract. When there is no possibility of effective control over the agent, he may begin to act on the basis of his own interests, which do not necessarily coincide with the interests of the firm that hired him. The problem becomes especially acute when people work together ("team") and it is very difficult to determine the personal contribution of each.

Extortion (holding-up) is observed when any of the agents made investments in specific assets. Then his partners have the opportunity to claim a part of the income from these assets, otherwise threatening to break off relations (for this purpose, they may begin to insist on revising the price of the product received, improving its quality, increasing the volume of supplies, etc.). The threat of "extortion" undermines incentives to invest in specific assets.

6. Costs of "politicization". This general term can be used to designate the costs that accompany decision-making within organizations. If the participants are endowed with equal rights, then decisions are made on a collective basis, by voting. If they are located at different levels of the hierarchical ladder, then the higher ones unilaterally make decisions that are mandatory for the lower ones.

4. Ronald Coase

The nineties of the 20th century brought success to economists in the way of researching the market, property, firm, corporation. A kind of synthesis of neoclassicism and institutionalism, "pure" theory and applied developments, macro- and microeconomic analysis was formed. The rapid introduction of theoretical results into practice forces us to repeat the words of one of the outstanding physicists: "There is nothing more practical than a good theory." The world of economists has started talking about a new paradigm in science that can determine both the future of the economy itself and its application in various areas of the economy. One of the troublemakers was an American

Ronald Coase (Nobel laureate 1991).

Ronald Coase received his award "for pioneering work on transaction costs and property rights" at a very advanced age - an 80-year-old professor at the University of Chicago has been retired for more than 10 years. He was born in 1910 in the UK and graduated from the London School of Economics. After moving to the USA, he worked at the University of Virginia and the University of Chicago. Coase's writings serve as a brilliant refutation of the now seemingly irrefutable opinion that success in economic research can only be achieved by applying mathematical methods, constructing multi-factor models. In Coase's writings there are no formalized models, mathematical calculations, or even graphs and diagrams. However, they (only three articles published in 1937, 1946 and 1960) revolutionized the vision of economic reality, served as a source of paradigm changes in modern economic analysis, and gave rise to a number of rapidly developing scientific concepts.

Coase's ideas were not immediately understood and accepted. The article "The Nature of the Firm" published in 1937 did not make any impression at the time. The attention of scientists at that time was riveted to the macroeconomic theory of Keynes, to the works analyzing "market failures" and substantiating the inevitability of state regulation of the market system. Coase, in this and subsequent publications, approached the problems of the market, the firm, and the state from a completely different angle. In the end, his ideas began to provoke serious objections from many American economists, especially professors at the University of Chicago, who were literally discouraged by the paradoxical approach and conclusions of not the most eminent of scientists.

It seemed to be generally accepted and known even to college students about “market failures”, about the inevitability of state regulation of monopolies, financing of education and decision environmental issues have been turned upside down. Coase, he writes, "was compelled to expound his views more fully" by publishing "The Problem of Social Costs." Since that time, the theories of "property rights" and "transaction costs" developed by scientists are beginning to gain recognition, and most importantly, their application in practice is effective.

5. Coase theorem

An analysis of the problem of social costs led Coase to a conclusion that J. Stigler called the Coase theorem. The gist of it is that if the property rights of all parties are carefully defined, and transaction costs are equal to the bullet, the end result (maximizing the value of production) does not depend on changes in the distribution of property rights.

Transaction costs are zero, which means:

· Everyone knows everything else; they recognize it instantly and unambiguously. Everyone understands each other perfectly, that is, words are unnecessary.

· Everyone's expectations and interests are always aligned. When the conditions change, the agreement is instantaneous. Any opportunistic behavior is excluded.

· Each product or resource corresponds to a set of interchangeable ones. transaction cost

Under these conditions, “the initial distribution of property rights has absolutely no effect on the structure of production, since in the end each property will be in the hands of the owner, who is able to offer the highest price for it based on the most efficient use of this right”

Comparison of the pricing system, which includes liability for damage from negative externalities, with the pricing system, when there is no such liability, led R. Coase to the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that if the participants can agree on their own, the costs of such negotiations are negligible (transactional costs are equal to zero), then in both cases under the conditions perfect competition the highest possible production value is achieved.

However, when transaction costs are taken into account, the desired result may not be achieved. The fact is that the high cost of obtaining the necessary information, negotiating and litigation can exceed the possible benefits of concluding a deal. In addition, when assessing damage, significant differences in consumer preferences cannot be ruled out (for example, one estimates the same damage much more than another). To account for these differences, a caveat regarding the income effect was later introduced into the formulation of the Coase theorem.

Experimental studies have shown that the Coase theorem is true for a limited number of participants in the transaction (two or three). With an increase in the number of participants, transaction costs increase sharply and the assumption of their zero value ceases to be correct.

It is curious to note that the Coase theorem proves the value of transaction costs “by contradiction”. In reality, they play a huge role, and it is surprising that neoclassical economic theory did not notice them at all until recently.

A huge contribution to the transactional theory was made by: O. Williamson, A. Alchiani, G. Demsets, S. Grosman and others.

Conclusion

Transaction cost theorists have succeeded in identifying the most important characteristics that determine the essence of the firm. These are the formation of a complex network of contracts, the long-term nature of business relations, the production of a single "team", investing in specific assets, the administrative mechanism for coordinating with the help of orders. All explanations that developed the ideas of R. Coase proceeded from a general idea of the firm as a tool for saving transaction costs.

According to the theory of transaction costs, this key principle explains not only the very fact of the existence of firms, but also many particular aspects of their functioning - financial structure, forms of management, organization of the labor process, etc. The fruitfulness of this approach was confirmed in the study of hybrid organizational forms intermediate between the market and the firm, such as franchising. He contributed to a radical rethinking of antitrust regulation by demonstrating that many atypical forms of business practice are explained not by the pursuit of monopoly advantages, but by the desire to save transaction costs.

The theory of transaction costs has become widespread in our country. Modern representatives of which are Malakhov S., Kokorev V., Barsukova S.Yu., Shastiko A.E., Kapelyushnikov R.I. and etc.

So, for example, Malakhov considers the role of transaction costs in the Russian economy. Kokorev analyzes their dynamics. Barsukova identifies transaction costs in small businesses.

Thanks to the transactional approach, modern economic theory has become more realistic, discovering a wide range of business life phenomena that previously fell completely out of its field of vision.

Bibliography

1. Borisov E.F. Economic theory. M.: URAIT, 2002

2. Gross D.V. Political Economy. M.: Prospekt, 1999

3. Dobrynina A.I., Tarasevich L.S. Economic theory. M.: 2001

4. Barsukova S.Yu. Transaction costs of entering the market of small businesses // Problems of forecasting. - 2000. - No. 1.

5. Kamaev V.D. Economic theory. Moscow UNITI, 2002

6. Mugalimov M.G. Basics of economic theory. OOO "Interpressservis", UE "ECOPERSPEKTIVA", Minsk, 2002

7. Malakhov S. Transaction costs in the Russian economy // Issues of Economics - 1997.- No. 7

8. Malakhov S. Transaction costs and macroeconomic balance // Questions of Economics. - 1998. -№11.

9. Kokorev V. Institutional transformations in modern Russia: analysis of the dynamics of transaction costs // Questions of Economics. - 1996.-

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Volchik V.V.

1. The concept and types of transactions

The concept of transaction was first introduced into scientific circulation by J. Commons.

A transaction is not an exchange of goods, but an alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms created by society. Such a definition makes sense (Commons) due to the fact that institutions ensure the extension of the will of an individual beyond the limits of the area in which he can influence the environment directly by his actions, i.e. beyond the scope of physical control, and, therefore, turn out to be trans- shares as opposed to individual behavior per se or the exchange of goods.

Commons distinguished three main types of transactions:

1) Transaction transaction - serves to carry out the actual alienation and assignment of property rights and freedoms, and in its implementation, the mutual consent of the parties is required, based on the economic interest of each of them.

In the transaction of the transaction, the condition of symmetry of relations between counterparties is observed. The hallmark of the transaction transaction, according to Commons, is not the production, but the transfer of goods from hand to hand.

2) Transaction of control - the key in it is the relationship of control of subordination, which involves such interaction between people when the right to make decisions belongs to only one side. In a management transaction, behavior is clearly asymmetric, which is a consequence of the asymmetry of the position of the parties and, accordingly, the asymmetry of legal relations.

3) The transaction of rationing - with it, the asymmetry of the legal status of the parties is preserved, but the place of the managing party is occupied by a collective body that performs the function of specifying rights. Rationing transactions include: the preparation of the company's budget by the board of directors, the federal budget by the government and approval by a representative authority, the decision of the arbitration court on a dispute that arises between acting entities, through which wealth is distributed. There is no control in the rationing transaction. Through such a transaction, wealth is endowed to one or another economic agent.

The presence of transaction costs makes certain types of transactions more or less economical, depending on the circumstances of time and place. Therefore, the same operations can be mediated by different types of transactions, depending on the rules they order.

2. The concept of transaction costs

Criticism of the position of the neoclassical theory that the exchange occurs without costs, served as the basis for the introduction of a new concept in economic analysis - transaction costs (transaction cost).

The concept of transaction costs was introduced by R. Coase in the 30s in his article "Nature of the Firm". It has been used to explain the existence of such hierarchical structures as opposed to the market, such as the firm. R. Coase associated the formation of these "islands of consciousness" with their relative advantages in terms of saving on transaction costs. He saw the specifics of the functioning of the company in the suppression of the price mechanism and its replacement by a system of internal administrative control.

Within the framework of modern economic theory, transaction costs have received many interpretations, sometimes diametrically opposed.

So K. Arrow defines transaction costs as the costs of operating the economic system. Arrow compared the effect of transaction costs in economics with the effect of friction in physics. Based on such assumptions, conclusions are drawn that the closer the economy is to the Walrasian general equilibrium model, the lower the level of transaction costs in it, and vice versa.

In the interpretation of D. North, Transaction costs “consist of the costs of evaluating useful properties the object of exchange and the cost of enforcing and enforcing rights”. These costs serve as a source of social, political and economic institutions.

In the theories of some economists, transaction costs exist not only in a market economy (Coase, Arrow, North), but also in alternative ways economic organization and in particular in the planned economy (S. Chang, A. Alchian, Demsets). Thus, according to Chang, the maximum transaction costs are observed in the planned economy, which ultimately determines its inefficiency.

2. Typology of transaction costs Transaction and transformation costs

There are many classifications and typologies of transaction costs in the economic literature. The most common is the following typology, which includes five types of transaction costs:

1. Information search costs. Before a deal is made or a contract is concluded, it is necessary to have information about where you can find potential buyers and sellers of the relevant goods and factors of production, what are the current prices. The costs of this kind are made up of the time and resources required to conduct the search, as well as the losses associated with the incompleteness and imperfection of the acquired information.

3. Measurement costs. Any product or service is a set of characteristics. The act of exchange inevitably takes into account only some of them, and the accuracy of their assessment (measurement) is extremely approximate. Sometimes the qualities of a product of interest are not measurable at all, and one has to use surrogates to evaluate them (for example, to judge the taste of apples by their color). This includes the costs of the relevant measuring equipment, the actual measurement itself, the implementation of measures designed to protect the parties from measurement errors and, finally, the losses from these errors. Measurement costs increase with increasing accuracy requirements.

Huge savings in measurement costs have been achieved by mankind as a result of the invention of standards for weights and measures. In addition, such forms of business practices as warranty repairs, company labels, purchasing batches of goods from samples, etc. are driven by the goal of saving these costs.

4. Costs of specification and protection of property rights. This category includes expenses for the maintenance of courts, arbitration, state bodies, the time and resources6 required to restore violated rights, as well as losses from their poor specification and unreliable protection. Some authors (D. North) add here the costs of maintaining a consensus ideology in society, since educating members of society in the spirit of observing generally accepted unwritten rules and ethical standards is a much more economical way to protect property rights than formalized legal control.

5. Costs of opportunistic behavior. This is the most hidden and, from the point of view of economic theory, the most interesting element of transaction costs.

There are two main forms of opportunistic behavior. The first is called moral hazard. Moral hazard arises when one party relies on the other in a contract, and obtaining valid information about its behavior is costly or impossible. The most common type of opportunistic behavior of this kind is shirking, when the agent works with less efficiency than is required of him under the contract.

Particularly favorable soil for shirking is created in the conditions of joint work by the whole group. For example, how to highlight the personal contribution of each employee to the total result of activity<команды>factory or government agency? We have to use surrogate measurements and, say, judge the productivity of many workers not by the result, but by the costs (like the duration of work), but these indicators often turn out to be inaccurate.

In private firms and in government agencies, special complex and expensive structures are created, whose tasks include monitoring the behavior of agents, detecting cases of opportunism, imposing penalties, etc. Reducing the costs of opportunistic behavior is the main function of a significant part of the administrative apparatus of various organizations.

The second form of opportunistic behavior is extortion. Opportunities for it appear when several production factors work in close cooperation for a long time and get used to each other so much that each becomes irreplaceable, unique for the rest of the group. This means that if some factor decides to leave the group, then the other participants in the cooperation will not be able to find an equivalent replacement for it on the market and will suffer irreparable losses. Therefore, the owners of unique (in relation to a given group of participants) resources have the opportunity for blackmail in the form of a threat to leave the group. Even when<вымогательство>remains only a possibility, it always turns out to be associated with real losses (The most radical form of protection against extortion is the transformation of interdependent (interspecific) resources into jointly owned property, the integration of property in the form of a single bundle of powers for all team members).

The above classification is not the only one, for example, there is also a classification by K. Menard:

1. Isolation costs (similar to 5 (shirking).

3 what costs make up a variety of transaction costs. Examples of transaction costs: theory, forms and types

annotation scientific article on economics and business, author of scientific work - Medushushskaya Inna Evgenievna

Related Topics scientific works on economics and business, author of scientific work - Medushushskaya Inna Evgenievna

TRANSACTION COSTS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION

Definition, conditions of occurrence, meaning

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2. The concept and types of transactions

The concept of transaction was first introduced into scientific circulation by J. Commons.

Commons distinguished three main types of transactions:

1) Transaction transaction - serves to carry out the actual alienation and assignment of property rights and freedoms, and in its implementation, the mutual consent of the parties is required, based on the economic interest of each of them.

2) Transaction of management - in it the key is the relationship of management of subordination, which involves such interaction between people when the right to make decisions belongs to only one side.

Through such a transaction, wealth is endowed to one or another economic agent.

The presence of transaction costs makes certain types of transactions more or less economical, depending on the circumstances of time and place. Therefore, the same operations can be mediated by different types of transactions, depending on the rules they order.

Transactions range from simple, such as buying a bunch of radishes from the market, to complex ones, such as implementing an ERP system with the help of external consultants. Complex and responsible agreements are always formalized by contracts. Any Transaction consists of two parts:

· Implementation of the agreement. In this phase, the buyer pays for the goods, receives it at his disposal, evaluates its quality again.

Each Transaction necessarily defines 4 groups of parameters:

The participants in the transaction

The resources used in the transaction and the expected results,

The rights of participants to resources and results,

· Duties of the parties.

3. Transaction costs and their types

Transaction costs - any losses arising from the inefficiency of joint decisions, plans, contracts and established structures. Transaction costs limit opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation.

Developing Coase's analysis, supporters of the transactional approach have proposed various classifications of transaction costs (costs). According to one of them, there are:

4. Costs of specification and .. This category includes the costs of maintaining courts, arbitration, state bodies, the time and resources required to restore violated rights, as well as losses from their poor specification and unreliable protection.

4. Ronald Coase

Ronald Coase (Nobel laureate 1991).

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